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**IMPOSITION OF RESTRICTIONS ON SOVIET
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE U. S.**

**(To be discussed at Second meeting of
IAO Ad Hoc Committee, 26 April 1950)**

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USAF review(s) completed.

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PROBLEM:

1. To determine whether the imposition of restrictions on the representatives of the USSR and satellites in the U. S. would be to the advantage or disadvantage of the U. S.

DISCUSSION:

2. Imposition of restrictions as envisaged above will, undoubtedly, have some tangible effects. It is often suggested that the immediate effect would be the application by the Soviets of countermeasures against U. S. representatives. Allegedly, such countermeasures could result in: (a) eventual severance of diplomatic relations or (b) at least a crippling of the intelligence collection effort of the U. S. in the USSR and satellites.

3. Such a view is not substantiated by close analysis.

a. It is justifiable to state that if a break in diplomatic relations at this point is not desired by the USSR, the imposition of restrictions, as envisaged above will not produce such a break, and, conversely, that if severance of diplomatic relations is in the making, the USSR can create the needed incident to produce such result at any time it wishes to do so without waiting for the U. S. to provide the occasion.

b. It must be remembered that there is only a limited range of countermeasures, short of a break in diplomatic relations, remaining available to the USSR against U. S. representatives, considering all those already in force; on the other hand, the range of applicable restrictions available to the U. S. is wide, in view of the present relative freedom enjoyed by Soviet representatives in the U. S. This places the USSR in a disadvantageous position.

c. Furthermore, the absence of retaliatory measures against their representatives in the U. S. is most likely interpreted by the Soviets as a policy of appeasement. Such interpretation has, actually, a basis in fact:

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What else can a policy be called, which advocates to do nothing which may provoke countermeasures? Therefore, the continuation of the present soft treatment may produce gradual further restrictions.

4. History shows that the USSR has usually backed down in its endeavors when encountering firmness and determined resistance but is also known to have taken advantage of every vacuum or lack of counterpressures. From 1933 to 1935, while the Nazi Party suppressed the German Communist Party and destroyed its apparatus in a determined manner, the USSR backed down and sought to conclude an agreement with Germany. In 1924, when Laval declared in Moscow that France would not sign the Franco-Soviet alliance, being negotiated, unless the USSR agreed to have the French Communist Party sterilized, Stalin quickly acceded. In 1947, when pressure was being applied by the USSR against Turkey, demanding territorial concessions, the pronouncement of the Truman Doctrine and the cruise by the battleship Missouri into Turkish waters to add weight to the pronouncement, produced a tactical retreat by the Soviets. The Azerbaidjan case, and many others can be brought as further evidence of such Soviet tactics.

5. In view of the pattern set by the historical examples listed above and due to such disadvantageous position, it is believed that a firm, well defined and enforced policy of reciprocity in the treatment by the U. S. of Soviet and satellite representatives in the U. S. may prove to be the lever needed to extract better treatment of our representatives in the USSR.

6. With respect to the overall U. S. intelligence effort, a brief survey was made by the Collection Control Branch of the D/I, USAF, which indicated roughly that quantitatively, the intelligence collected in the USSR and satellites represented but 1.3% of the total collected by the USAF. The figures representing the intelligence collection efforts of the Army and Navy are probably comparable. Qualitatively, of course, it is not possible to cite percentages; the Collection Control Branch considers that some information is normally obtained through personal observations by air attaches which is not otherwise obtainable. But, as a rule, the value of such information is questionable in view of the fact that the Soviets are aware that this information

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was obtained by U. S. representatives and, in some cases, it is data which the Soviets wanted to become known to the United States.

Largely the information collected by air attaches in the USSR and satellites is confirmatory.

A further curtailment of the movements of U. S. representatives, if achieved by the Soviets by application of countermeasures and further restrictions, would, no doubt, result in a decrease in the amount of intelligence obtained by these means but would not completely eliminate this source. For example, total curtailment of travel in the USSR and satellites would prevent the air attaches from being able to report on areas outside of Moscow. Little comes out of this type of activity in any event. This could not, however, prevent U. S. representatives from continuing to observe such events as the May Day Parade and/or the Air Day Show which, actually, account for a good share of the collection effort within the USSR.

CONCLUSIONS:

7. It is concluded that restrictive measures by the U. S. against the representatives of the USSR and satellites, would:

a. Result in a situation favorable to the U. S. for obtaining better treatment by the USSR and satellites of U. S. representatives.

b. Not prohibitively jeopardize the intelligence collection effort of the U. S. in the USSR and satellites.

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